How “omnipotent” hackers tied to NSA hid for 14 years—and were found at last

Mistakes were made

No matter how elite a hacking group may be, Raiu said, mistakes are inevitable. Equation Group made several errors that allowed Kaspersky researchers to glean key insights into an operation that went unreported for at least 14 years.

Kaspersky first came upon the Equation Group in March 2014, while researching the Regin software that infected Belgacom and a variety of other targets. In the process, company researchers analyzed a computer located in the Middle East and dubbed the machine "Magnet of Threats" because, in addition to Regin, it was infected by four other highly advanced pieces of malware, including Turla, Careto/Mask, ItaDuke, and Animal Farm. A never-before-seen sample of malware on the computer piqued researchers' interest and turned out to be an EquationDrug module.

Following the discovery, Kaspersky researchers combed through their cloud-based Kaspersky Security Network of exploits and infections reported by AV users and looked for similarities and connections. In the following months, the researchers uncovered additional pieces of malware used by Equation Group as well as the domain names used to host command channels.

Perhaps most costly to the attackers was their failure to renew some of the domains used by these servers. Out of the 300 or so domains used, about 20 were allowed to expire. Kaspersky quickly registered the domains and, over the past ten months, has used them to "sinkhole" the command channels, a process in which researchers monitor incoming connections from Equation Group-infected machines.

One of the most severe renewal failures involved a channel that controlled computers infected by "EquationLaser," an early malware platform abandoned around 2003 when antivirus programs began to detect it. The underlying domain name remained active for years until one day, it didn't; Kaspersky acquired it and EquationLaser-infected machines still report to it.

"It's really surprising to see there are victims around the world infected with this malware from 12 years ago," Raiu said. He continues to see about a dozen infected machines that report from countries that include Russia, Iran, China, and India.

Raiu said 90 percent or more of the command and control servers were closed last year, although some remained active as recently as last month.

"We understand just how little we know. It also makes us reflect about how many other things remain hidden or unknown."

The sinkholes have allowed Kaspersky researchers to gather key clues about the operation, including the number of infected computers reporting to the seized command domains, the countries in which these compromised computers are likely located, and the types of operating systems they run.

Another key piece of information gleaned by Kaspersky: some machines infected by Equation Group are the "patients zero" that were used to seed the Stuxnet worm so it would travel downstream and infect Iran's Natanz facility.

"It is quite possible that the Equation Group malware was used to deliver the Stuxnet payload," Kaspersky researchers wrote in their report.

Other key mistakes were variable names, developer account names, and similar artifacts left in various pieces of Equation Group malware. In the same way cat burglars wear gloves to conceal their fingerprints, attackers take great care to scrub such artifacts out of their code before releasing it. But in at least 13 cases, they failed. Possibly the most telling artifact is the string "-standalonegrok_2.1.1.1" that accompanies a highly advanced keylogger tied to Equation Group.

Another potentially damaging artifact found by Kaspersky is the Windows directory path of "c:\users\rmgree5" belonging to one of the developer accounts that compiled Equation Group malware. Assuming the rmgree5 wasn't a randomly generated account name, it may be possible to link it to a developer's real-world identity if the handle has been used for other accounts or if it corresponds to a developer's real-world name such as "Richard Gree" or "Robert Greenberg."

Kaspersky researchers still don't know what to make of the 11 remaining artifacts, but they hope fellow researchers can connect the strings to other known actors or incidents. The remaining artifacts are:

• SKYHOOKCHOW
• prkMtx - unique mutex used by the Equation Group's exploitation library (gPrivLibh)
• "SF" - as in "SFInstall", "SFConfig"
• "UR", "URInstall" - "Performing UR-specific post-install..."
• "implant" - from "Timeout waiting for the "canInstallNow" event from the implant-specific EXE!"
• STEALTHFIGHTER (VTT/82055898/STEALTHFIGHTER/2008-10-16/14:59:06.229-04:00
• DRINKPARSLEY - (Manual/DRINKPARSLEY/2008-09-30/10:06:46.468-04:00)
• STRAITACID - (VTT/82053737/STRAITACID/2008-09-03/10:44:56.361-04:00)
• LUTEUSOBSTOS - (VTT/82051410/LUTEUSOBSTOS/2008-07-30/17:27:23.715-04:00)
• STRAITSHOOTER - STRAITSHOOTER30.exe
• DESERTWINTER - c:\desert~2\desert~3\objfre_w2K_x86\i386\DesertWinterDriver.pdb

Hacking without a budget

The money and time required to develop the Equation Group malware, the technological breakthroughs the operation accomplished, and the interdictions performed against targets leave little doubt that the operation was sponsored by a nation-state with nearly unlimited resources to dedicate to the project. The countries that were and weren't targeted, the ties to Stuxnet and Flame, and the Grok artifact found inside the Equation Group keylogger strongly support the theory the NSA or a related US agency is the responsible party, but so far Kaspersky has declined to name a culprit.

Update: Reuters reporter Joseph Menn said the hard-drive firmware capability has been confirmed by two former government employees. He wrote:

A former NSA employee told Reuters that Kaspersky's analysis was correct, and that people still in the intelligence agency valued these spying programs as highly as Stuxnet. Another former intelligence operative confirmed that the NSA had developed the prized technique of concealing spyware in hard drives, but said he did not know which spy efforts relied on it.

Update: Several hours ater this post went live, NSA officials e-mailed the following statement to Ars:

We are aware of the recently released report. We are not going to comment publicly on any allegations that the report raises, or discuss any details. On January 17, 2014, the President gave a detailed address about our signals intelligence activities, and he also issued Presidential Policy Directive 28 (PPD-28). As we have affirmed publicly many times, we continue to abide by the commitments made in the President’s speech and PPD-28. The U.S. Government calls on our intelligence agencies to protect the United States, its citizens, and its allies from a wide array of serious threats - including terrorist plots from al-Qaeda, ISIL, and others; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; foreign aggression against ourselves and our allies; and international criminal organizations.

What is safe to say is that the unearthing of the Equation Group is a seminal finding in the fields of computer and national security, as important, or possibly more so, than the revelations about Stuxnet.

"The discovery of the Equation Group is significant because this omnipotent cyber espionage entity managed to stay under the radar for almost 15 years, if not more," Raiu said. "Their incredible skills and high tech abilities, such as infecting hard drive firmware on a dozen different brands, are unique across all the actors we have seen and second to none. As we discover more and more advanced threat actors, we understand just how little we know. It also makes us reflect about how many other things remain hidden or unknown."